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ARTICLE
Arguments in Support of a Constitutional
Right to Atmospheric Integrity
ELIZABETH FULLER VALENTINE

I.

INTRODUCTION

The overwhelming scientific consensus is that, due to human
activity, the global climate is changing in a manner that will be
disruptive to human and ecological communities.1 While climate
change has been described as “one of the defining issues of our

Elizabeth Fuller Valentine is a 2014 cum laude graduate of the University
of Maine School of Law. She is licensed to practice in Maine and Massachusetts
and is presently launching a solo practice to provide legal support to local food
enterprises and sustainable communities. She draws upon her legal training
and her fifteen years of experience in environmental management and
sustainable development to assist clients in achieving their goals.
1. See generally, AM. ASS’N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCI., WHAT WE KNOW:
THE REALITY, RISKS AND RESPONSE TO CLIMATE CHANGE (2014) [hereinafter
AAAS] (“Based on well-established evidence, about 97% of climate scientists
have concluded that human-caused climate change is happening.”);
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS,
CLIMATE CHANGE 2013: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS: CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING
GROUP I TO THE FIFTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL
ON CLIMATE CHANGE (Thomas F. Stocker et al. eds., 2013), available at
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/wg1/WGIAR5_SPM_brochure_
en.pdf [hereinafter IPCC 2013]; INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND
VULNERABILITY: CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP II TO THE FIFTH ASSESSMENT
REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (Christopher B.
Field et al. eds., 2014), available at http://ipcc-wg2.gov/AR5/images/uploads/
IPCC_WG2AR5_SPM_Approved.pdf [hereinafter IPCC 2014]; NAT’L ACAD. OF
SCI. & THE ROYAL SOC’Y, CLIMATE CHANGE EVIDENCE & CAUSES (2014)
[hereinafter NAS AND THE ROYAL SOCIETY]; James Hansen et al., Assessing
“Dangerous Climate Change”: Required Reduction of Carbon Emissions to
Protect Young People, Future Generations and Nature, PLOS ONE, Dec. 2013, at
1, available at http://www.plosone.org/article/fetchObject.action?uri=info%
3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0081648&representation=PDF.

56

1

2_VALENTINE FINAL

2015

8/24/2015 12:04 PM

ATMOSPHERIC INTEGRITY

57

time,”2 the global community’s response to date has been largely
ineffective. For example, levels of greenhouse gases in the
atmosphere have continued to rise3 despite an agreement made
by the majority of the world’s nations in 1992 to stabilize
atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases “at a level that
would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the
climate system.”4 Scientific evidence strongly suggests that we
have reached the threshold of dangerous anthropogenic
interference.5 Accordingly, now is the time for a concerted,
worldwide effort to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Within the
United States, political and private sector responses to climate
change could be guided by judicial recognition of a fundamental
right to atmospheric integrity.
Constitutions ratify societies’ highest values,6 help to engage
societies in public discourse about important issues,7 supply an
over-arching normative framework for directing policy,8 provide a
basis for requesting judicial relief and imposing meaningful
responsibilities on governments,9 and provide a degree of
protection from daily politics where long-term goals frequently

2. Foreword to NAS AND THE ROYAL SOCIETY, supra note 1, at C2.
3. See EPA, CLIMATE CHANGE INDICATORS IN THE UNITED STATES:
ATMOSPHERIC CONCENTRATIONS OF GREENHOUSE GASES (2014), available at
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/pdfs/print_ghg-concentrations-2014.pdf.
4. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 2, May 9,
1992, S. Treaty Doc No. 102–38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107, available at
https://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/background_publications_htmlpdf/a
pplication/pdf/conveng.pdf [hereinafter UNFCCC].
5. See infra Part II.
6. Bruce Ledewitz, Establishing a Federal Constitutional Right to a Healthy
Environment in Us and in Our Posterity, 68 MISS. L.J. 565, 593 (1998); see also,
John C. Dernbach, Taking the Pennsylvania Constitution Seriously When It
Protects the Environment: Part I – An Interpretative Framework of Article I,
Section 27, 103 DICK. L. REV. 693, 732 (1999) (“[C]onstitutional provisions
represent an enduring commitment to the values and principles they contain.”).
7. Joshua J. Bruckerhoff, Giving Nature Constitutional Protection: A Less
Anthropocentric Interpretation of Environmental Rights, 86 TEX. L. REV. 615,
623 (2008) (“A constitutional right to a healthy environment also encourages
greater civic involvement in environmental concerns and informs the public
about the importance of environmental protection.”).
8. Id. at 624.
9. Dernbach, supra note 6, at 723.
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fall victim to short-term political gains.10 Most significantly, a
right to atmospheric integrity would serve as a counterweight to
the presumed right to permanently alter the environment.11 As
presently construed, constitutionally-protected property rights
reflect “our old attitude of oblivious destruction, as if the right to
disrupt were inalienable.”12 However, if property and other
presently-recognized rights were prudentially balanced against
an equally fundamental right to atmospheric integrity, society
would be directed toward a more sustainable path of
development.13
Given the opportunity, therefore, the Supreme Court should
recognize a fundamental right to atmospheric integrity in order to
protect current and future Americans from the worst effects of
climate change. A right to atmospheric integrity would also
establish America’s obligation to reduce greenhouse gas
concentrations in the atmosphere to a level that will permit the
global climate to remain within the range in which modern
civilization has developed. That is, an obligation for the nation to
do its part to return the atmospheric concentration of carbon
dioxide (CO2) to 350 parts per million (ppm).
10. Bruckerhoff, supra note 7, at 623. See generally Ledewitz, supra note 6, at
627 (“[T]he right to a healthy environment . . . will come to exist in light of a
serious threat that ordinary political life is not capable of adequately
addressing. If circumstances should come to that, even the ordinarily restrained
judge should heed the words of Abraham Lincoln: ‘The dogmas of the quiet past
are inadequate for the stormy present and future. As our circumstances are
new, we must think anew, and act anew.’”).
11. Ledewitz, supra note 6, at 585–86; see Naomi Oreskes, The Scientific
Consensus on Climate Change: How Do We Know We’re Not Wrong?, in CLIMATE
CHANGE: WHAT IT MEANS FOR US, OUR CHILDREN, AND OUR GRANDCHILDREN 65,
93 (Joseph F. C. DiMento & Pamela Doughman eds., 1st ed. 2007) (“To deny
that global warming is real is precisely to deny that humans have become
geological agents, changing the most basic physical processes of the earth. . . .
We have changed the chemistry of our atmosphere, causing sea level to rise, ice
to melt, and climate to change. There is no reason to think otherwise.”).
12. Eric T. Freyfogle, Should We Green the Bill?, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 159, 170
(1992).
13. See Dernbach, supra note 6, at 718 (“When an environmental provision is
written into the constitution, all constitutional decision making concerning other
provisions must be reconciled with the Amendment whenever possible. That
creates an obligation by the state to ensure that consideration and protection of
constitutional values concerning the environment are made part of all state
decision making.).
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As used in this paper, “atmospheric integrity”14 refers to the
interrelated physical, chemical, and biological processes on planet
Earth that enable human and non-human life now and in the
future and recognizes that modern civilization has developed
within the relatively stable, current geologic period known as the
Holocene.15 I chose to focus on atmospheric integrity, rather than
more broadly on environmental integrity, because the health of
terrestrial and aquatic habitats is inextricably tied to
atmospheric stability. This assertion is not meant to minimize the
multitude of harms impacting land and water. It is just that the
magnitude of the climate crisis overwhelms all other
environmental threats and will have obvious, detrimental
impacts on humanity. Also, the determination of what constitutes
a decent environment is a value judgment over which reasonable
people will differ.16 Conversely, focusing on a goal that can be
measured with scientific accuracy will enable courts and policy
makers to confidently measure progress toward (or away from)
the goal.
In this paper I explore the establishment of a federal
constitutional right to atmospheric integrity. I begin, in Part II,
with a review of the threat presented by global climate change. In
Part III, I discuss various conceptions of rights: constitutional,
basic, natural, and human. I then review modes of constitutional

14. Other authors have described a similar concept using terms such as a
“healthy”, “healthful,” “safe,” or “clean” environment. See, e.g., Noralee Gibson,
The Right to a Clean Environment, 54 SASK. L. REV. 5, 16 (1990) (“[T]he right to
a clean environment.” (emphasis added)); Ledewitz, supra note 6; Neil A.F.
Popovic, Pursuing Environmental Justice with International Human Rights and
State Constitutions, 15 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 338, 341, 345 (1996).
15. Holocene, NEW WORLD ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://www.newworldencyclopedia.
org/entry/Holocene (last visited Jan. 29, 2015) ("Human civilization dates
entirely to the Holocene.").
16. Alan Boyle, Human Rights and the Environment: Where Next?, 23 EUR. J.
INT’L L. 613, 626 (2012); see also, Mont. Envtl. Info. Ctr. v. Dep’t of Envtl.
Quality, 988 P.2d 1236, 1246–48 (Mont. 1999) (discussing the debate among
delegates to the 1972 Montana Constitutional Convention about whether to
include descriptive terms of an environmental right in that state’s constitution).
“The majority felt that the use of the word ‘healthful’ would permit those who
would pollute our environment to parade in some doctors who could say that if a
person can walk around with four pounds of arsenic in his lungs or SO2 gas in
his lungs and wasn't dead, that that would be a healthful environment.” Id. at
1246 (citation omitted).
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analysis
and
presently-recognized state and
national
constitutional environmental rights in Part IV. In Part V, I
review Robinson Township v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania17
in which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, for the first time,
provided substantive interpretation of the environmental rights
contained in the Commonwealth’s constitution. Finally, in Part
VI, I conclude that the Supreme Court may recognize a
constitutional right to atmospheric integrity based on historical,
doctrinal, prudential, ethical, and structural analysis.
II. CLIMATE CHANGE, A REAL AND IMMINENT
THREAT
The Earth receives its energy from the sun in the form of
solar radiation. Some of this radiation is reflected directly back
into space, some is absorbed by the Earth’s land and sea surfaces,
and some is absorbed by greenhouse gases in the atmosphere.18
Greenhouse gases, in turn, emit heat energy in all directions with
the result that Earth’s surface and lower atmosphere are warm
compared to space.19 Life as we know it would not be possible
without this greenhouse effect. There can be, however, too much
of a good thing. As levels of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere
increase, so too do surface temperatures.20
Since the time of the industrial revolution, humanity has
been mining carbon from the ground in the form of coal, oil, and
natural gas and transferring it to the atmosphere in the form of
carbon dioxide gas. Direct measurements of carbon dioxide in the
atmosphere and air trapped in ice reveal that carbon dioxide
concentrations are forty percent higher today as compared to
levels prior to the industrial revolution.21
The current
atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide and two other
greenhouse gases—methane and nitrous oxide—are presently at
levels unprecedented in the last 800,000 years.22 For the period
17. Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901 (Pa. 2013).
18. NAS AND THE ROYAL SOCIETY, supra note 1, at B1. Greenhouse gases
include carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, and water vapor. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 10.
21. Id. at 5.
22. IPCC 2013, supra note 1, at 9.
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starting 800,000 years ago and continuing up until the start of
the twentieth century, atmospheric concentrations of carbon
dioxide were in the range of 170 to 300 ppm.23
Today,
atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide have increased to
nearly 400 ppm. 24 Research suggests that the last time that
atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide approached 400
ppm was three to five million years ago.25
Since 1900, the Earth’s average surface temperature has
warmed by 0.8o C, with much of the increase occurring since the
mid-1970s.26 For sake of comparison, since the end of the last ice
age 18,000 years ago, the global temperature increased by four to
five degrees Celsius over about a 7,000 year period.27 The Earth
entered the present geologic period, the Holocene, about 10,000
years ago. Humanity and other species are adapted to the
Holocene range of conditions.28 The current speed of warming is
more than ten times faster than any known natural sustained
change on a global scale.29 More worrisome is the fact that the
pace of climate change over the next thirty to eighty years is
projected to continue to be faster and more intense than it
presently is.30 Even if carbon dioxide emissions were to stop
today—a wholly unrealistic possibility—excess carbon “will
remain in and affect the climate system for many millennia.”31
Additionally, increased global temperatures will persist for many
23. NAS AND THE ROYAL SOCIETY, supra note 1, at 9.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 10.
26. Id. at 3.
27. Id. at 9.
28. Hansen et al., supra note 1, at 1, 15.
29. NAS AND THE ROYAL SOCIETY, supra note 1, at 9; see also Noah S.
Diffenbaugh and C.B. Field, Changes in Ecologically Critical Terrestrial Climate
Conditions, 341 SCI. 486, 486 (2013), available at http://www.sciencemag.
org/content/341/6145/486.full.pdf (“Inertia toward continued emissions creates
potential 21st-century global warming that is comparable in magnitude to that
of the largest global changes in the past 65 million years but is orders of
magnitude more rapid.”).
30. COMM. ON UNDERSTANDING AND MONITORING ABRUPT CLIMATE CHANGE AND
ITS IMPACTS ET AL., ABRUPT IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE: ANTICIPATING
SURPRISES 5 (2013).
31. Hansen et al., supra note 1, at 6. “A pulse of CO2 injected into the air
decays by half in about 25 years as CO2 is taken up by the ocean, biosphere and
soil, but nearly one-fifth is still in the atmosphere after 500 years.” Id. at 10.
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centuries after emissions decline because of the persistence of
carbon dioxide in the atmosphere and the thermal inertia of the
ocean.32
The long-term consequences of global climate change are
expected to be disruptive to human societies.33 The changing
climate could affect:
human welfare, through changes in the supply of food and water;
human health through wider spread of infectious vector-borne
diseases, through heat stress and through mental illness; the
economy, through changes in goods and services; and national
security as a result of population shifts, heightened competition
for natural resources, violent conflict and geopolitical
instability.34

The “risk of severe economic disruption is rising.”35
Additional concerns include threats to coastal infrastructure and
the welfare of the huge population currently living in low-lying
areas.36
Climate change will undoubtedly lead to human
migration, displacement, and planned relocation, all of which
have implications for political stability.37
32. Hansen et al., supra note 1, at 13; see also, NAS AND THE ROYAL SOCIETY,
supra note 1, at 22 (“If emissions of CO2 stopped altogether, it would take many
thousands of years for atmospheric CO2 to return to ‘pre-industrial’ levels due to
its very slow transfer to the deep ocean and ultimate burial in ocean sediments.
Surface temperatures would stay elevated for at least a thousand years,
implying extremely long-term commitment to a warmer planet due to past and
current emissions, and sea level would likely continue to rise for many centuries
even after temperature stopped increasing.”).
33. NAS AND THE ROYAL SOCIETY, supra note 1, at 19. See generally Seth
Borenstein, Warming Report Sees Violent, Sicker, Poorer Future, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Nov. 2, 2013, http://bigstory.ap.org/article/warming-report-sees-violentsicker-poorer-future.
34. Camilo Mora et al., The Projected Timing of Climate Departure From
Recent Variability, 502 NATURE 183, 183 (2013) (internal citations omitted).
35. Justin Gillis, U.N. Says Lag in Confronting Climate Woes Will be Costly,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/17/science/earth/unsays-lag-in-confronting-climate-woes-will-be-costly.html?_r=1.
36. NAS AND THE ROYAL SOCIETY, supra note 1, at 19.
37. José Riera, Senior Adviser to the Director of International Protection,
U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees Headquarters, Challenges Relating to Climate
Change Induced Displacement, Remarks at “Millions of People Without
Protection: Climate Change Induced Displacement in Developing Countries”
International Conference (Jan. 29, 20130) (transcript available at
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The time at which climate in a given location will shift wholly
outside the range of historic precedent will vary. The global ocean
pH exceeded historical variability by 200838 due to the fact that
oceans become more acidic as they absorb carbon dioxide and
produce carbonic acid.39 Researchers predict that near-surface
air temperature of the average location on Earth will also move
beyond historical variability by 2047 (plus or minus 14 years)
under a business as usual scenario and by 2069 (plus or minus 18
years) under an emissions stabilization scenario.40 Tropical areas
will be the first to experience historically unprecedented climates
because of the relatively small natural climate variability in the
region.41 By 2050, “most tropical regions will have every
subsequent month outside of their historical range of
variability.”42 The roughly one billion people currently living in
tropical areas will bear the greatest environmental and social
costs of climate change, yet they are the least responsible for—

http://www.unhcr.org/5151bf239.html). “In its 2012 report providing estimates
of displacement provoked by natural disasters in 2011, the Norwegian Refugee
Council’s Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) reported that
disasters have doubled over the last two decades from about 200 to more than
400 per year. The report found that in 2011, 14.9 million people were displaced
within their own borders throughout the world due to natural disasters, mostly
related to weather events such as floods and storms. Some 89% of the
displacement occurred in Asia. The report concluded that the impact of climate
change, such as changing rainfall patterns and increases in temperature,
combined with rapid population growth, suggest that more and more people are
likely to be affected by displacement.” Id. at 3. See also Borenstein, supra note
33 (“Climate change indirectly increases risks from violent conflict in the form of
civil war, inter-group violence and violent protests by exacerbating wellestablished drivers of these conflicts such as poverty and economic shocks."
(quoting a leaked version of an IPCC draft report)).
38. Mora et al., supra note 34, at 185.
39. Hansen et al., supra note 1, at 7 (“Acidification arises as the ocean
absorbs CO2, producing carbonic acid, thus making the ocean more corrosive to
the calcium carbonate shells (exoskeletons) of many marine organisms.
Geochemical records show that ocean pH is already outside its range of the past
several million years. Warming causes coral bleaching, as overheated coral expel
symbiotic algae and become vulnerable to disease and mortality. Coral bleaching
and slowing of coral calcification already are causing mass mortalities, increased
coral disease, and reduced reef carbonate accretion, thus disrupting coral reef
ecosystem health.” (internal citations omitted)).
40. Mora et al., supra note 34, at 184.
41. Id. at 185.
42. Id.
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and derive the least economic benefit from—the greenhouse gas
emissions that are driving climate change.43 The imminence of
climate departure from recent historic variability underscores the
urgency of mitigating greenhouse gas emissions in order to avoid
widespread disruptions to human societies and global
biodiversity.44
There has been some, albeit largely ineffective,45
international movement toward a coordinated response to climate
change. One hundred ninety-five nations have agreed under the
1992 U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
to stabilize atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases “at a
level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference
with the climate system.”46 The Convention further states that
“such a level should be achieved within a time-frame sufficient to
allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure
that food production is not threatened, and to enable economic
development to proceed in a sustainable manner.”47
The
UNFCCC entered into force on March 21, 1994.48 Fifteen years
later, the parties to the framework convention, including the
United States, agreed in the Copenhagen Accord to limit global
warming to below 2o C relative to pre-industrial times.49 Current
science, however, indicates that a 2o C increase in global
temperature would be “disastrous” because:
[H]umanity and nature, the modern world as we know it, is
adapted to the Holocene climate that has existed more than
10,000 years. Warming of 1o C relative to 1880–1920 keeps global
43. Mora et al., supra note 34, at 186.
44. Id.
45. Hansen et al., supra note 1, at 17.
46. UNFCCC, supra note 4, art. 2. See also Daniel Bodansky, The United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: A Commentary, 18 YALE J.
INT’L L. 451, 453–54 (1993).
47. UNFCCC, supra note 4, art. 2.
48. Status of Ratification of the Convention, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK
CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/essential_background/
convention/status_of_ratification/items/2631.php (last visited Oct. 1, 2014).
49. Hansen et al., supra note 1, at 2; see also, Bill McKibbon, Global
Warming’s Terrifying New Math, ROLLING STONE, July 19, 2012,
http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/global-warmings-terrifying-new-math20120719?page=5 (describing that the Copenhagen Accord is a purely voluntary
agreement with no enforcement mechanism).
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temperature close to the Holocene range, but warming of 2 o C, to
at least the Eemian level, could cause major dislocations for
civilization.50

While the situation is dire, there is still hope. Specifically, a
return to approximately 350 ppm of carbon dioxide in the
atmosphere would restore the Earth’s energy balance.51 This
goal can be achieved this century by reducing greenhouse gas
emissions six percent per year while also simultaneously effecting
100 GtC of carbon storage in the biosphere and soils (e.g., through
reforestation and improved agricultural practices).52 If we delay
emission reductions until 2020, a reduction rate of fifteen percent
per year will be required to achieve 350 ppm in 2100.53 Delay not
only increases the magnitude of the necessary annual emission
reductions, it also further imperils youth and future generations.
Because the physical climate system has great inertia, there is
already additional climate change “in the pipeline.”54
Temperatures will continue to increase due to the carbon that has
already been emitted. Ongoing emissions will increase the total
amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere and further increase
Earth’s energy imbalance and associated repercussions. As a
consequence, youth and future generations are likely to inherit “a
situation in which grave consequences are assured, practically
out of their control, but not of their doing.”55

50. Hansen et al., supra note 1, at 15. See also, A.J. Challinor et al., A Metaanalysis of Crop Yield Under Climate Change and Adaptation, 4 NATURE
CLIMATE CHANGE 287 (2014), available at http://www.nature.com/nclimate/
journal/v4/n4/full/nclimate2153.html (“Without adaptation, losses in aggregate
production are expected for wheat, rice and maize in both temperate and
tropical regions by 2 °C of local warming.”).
51. Hansen et al., supra note 1, at 5.
52. Id. at 18.
53. Id. at 10.
54. Id. at 19.
55. Id. at 19–20.
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III. WHAT ARE RIGHTS?
Rights protect people from threats to their physical wellbeing, political equality, or sense of dignity.56 Where rights exist,
there is a correlated duty levied upon others to act to alleviate the
harm or to refrain from the harmful action itself.57 Rights may
be categorized as “constitutional,” “basic,” “natural,” and/or
“human.” Constitutional rights are those textual and non-textual
rights protected by a state or national constitution. Basic rights
are those that are “essential to normal life” and which are a
prerequisite to the practice of all other rights.58 For example, air
to breathe, water to drink, and food to eat are basic necessities of
life. The concept of basic rights is conceptually similar to the
seventeenth and eighteenth century concept of moral or “natural”
rights.59 According to Locke, Paine, Jefferson and others, natural
rights, unlike legal or contractual rights, are universal and exist
independently of government.60
The concept of human rights was first codified following the
atrocities of World War II in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR).61 Human rights, like natural rights, exist
independently of states; people have human rights because they
are people, not because they live in a particular place.62 Human
rights, though, differ from natural rights in that the modifier
“human” calls attention to the social context of the rights. 63
Human rights presume the existence of governments and define
relationships between governments and citizens.64 As such,
human rights are “fundamental international moral and legal

56. RICHARD P. HISKES, THE HUMAN RIGHT TO A GREEN FUTURE:
ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS AND INTERGENERATIONAL JUSTICE 36 (2009).
57. Id. at 41, 42, 46; see also, Freyfogle, supra note 12, at 165 (“A right cannot
exist . . . without a corresponding duty to protect it.”).
58. HISKES, supra note 56, at 39 (quoting HENRY SHUE, BASIC RIGHTS:
SUBSISTENCE, AFFLUENCE, AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY, 29–30, (2d ed. 1980)).
59. HISKES, supra note 56, at 26.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Popovic, supra note 14, at 352.
63. See HISKES, supra note 56, at 30.
64. Id.
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norms which protect people . . . from severe but common social,
political, and legal abuses.”65
In recent years there has been a convergence of
environmental rights with human rights.66 There is presently no
agreement on whether a human right to environmental integrity
exists.67 However, among scholars, “the idea of strong or even
absolute—i.e.
not
subject
to
balancing—environmental
fundamental rights seems to be gaining support.”68 One such
proponent is Professor Richard P. Hiskes who makes a compelling
argument that environmental rights are “emergent” human
rights defined, in part, by a society’s obligations to future
generations of its own community.69
According to Hiskes, where an emergent risk threatens basic
human needs, then protection from that harm takes the form of
“emergent rights.”70
That is, to the extent that human
interactions with the environment are harmful to both humans
and the natural environment, these detrimental effects ought to
generate human rights for protection from the detrimental
effects.71 Environmental rights “emerge” as rights when social
impacts to the natural world reach a critical juncture.72 Given
the robust scientific evidence of anthropogenic climate change, we
must, according to Hiskes’ reasoning, acknowledge the necessity
of a right to atmospheric integrity. Professor Hiskes concludes
that, “environmental rights do exist and are unique for their
expressly emergent character . . . . In their emergent nature and
their unique relationship to time, environmental rights invoke
65. James Nickel, The Human Right to a Safe Environment: Philosophical
Perspectives on Its Scope and Justification, 18 YALE J. INT’L L. 281, 288 (1993).
66. See, e.g., Popovic, supra note 14, at 340.
67. See generally Boyle, supra note 16; Bruckerhoff, supra note 7; Gibson,
supra note 14; Nickel, supra note 65.
68. Felix Ekardt, Climate Change and Justice: Perspectives of Legal Theory,
in CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE LAW 63, 66 (Erkki J. Hollo et al. eds., 2013).
69. See generally HISKES, supra note 56.
70. Id. at 29–30.
71. Id. at 30.
72. Id. at 40. For example, “when degradation of soil, water, and air supplies
become impossible to ignore, when human knowledge about how life impacts
environment and vice versa becomes widespread—with the emergence of these
factors in human history comes the understanding of the necessity of
environmental rights.” Id.
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the possibility of intergenerational justice at least as it pertains
to environmental protection and sustainability.”73 The
intergenerational aspect of Hiskes’ conception of environmental
rights is grounded in a community’s presumption of its own crossgeneration existence.74 That is, cultural continuity, including the
passage of political institutions to future generations, gives rise to
an obligation to respect the environmental human rights of future
generations.75
Hiskes’ conclusions evoke the theory of intergenerational
equity, which states that:
We, the human species, hold the natural environment of our
planet in common with other species, other people, and with past,
present and future generations. As members of the present
generation, we are both trustees, responsible for the robustness
and integrity of our planet, and beneficiaries, with the right to
use and benefit from it for ourselves.76

The right to use and benefit from the natural environment is
a generational right held by generations in relation to each
other.77 The right provides a moral basis for protecting the
interests of all generations in a healthy and robust planet.78
Intergenerational equity is defined by three normative principles:
1) each generation must conserve options such that it does not
unduly restrict options available to future generations;79 2) each
generation should maintain the quality of the planet so that it is
passed on in no worse condition than that it which it was
received;80 and 3) each generation should provide its members
with equitable rights of access to the legacy of past generations
73. HISKES, supra note 56, at 46.
74. Id. at 66.
75. Id. at 67.
76. Edith Brown Weiss, In Fairness to Future Generations and Sustainable
Development, 8 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 19, 20 (1992) [hereinafter “Weiss, In
Fairness”].
77. See generally Edith Brown Weiss, Intergenerational Equity: A Legal
Framework for Global Environmental Change, in ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW: NEW CHALLENGES AND DIMENSIONS 385 (Edith Brown Weiss
ed., 1992) [hereinafter “Weiss, Intergenerational Equity”].
78. See generally Weiss, Intergenerational Equity.
79. See infra notes 249–54 and accompanying text.
80. See infra notes 257–58 and accompanying text.
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and conserve access for future generations.81 The concept of
intergenerational equity has “gained significant traction both
rhetorically and as a legally cognizable principle in domestic and
international forums.”82
The pronounced international commitment to protecting the
environmental rights of future generations83 can be found in the
1972 Stockholm Convention: “Man has the fundamental right to
freedom, equality and adequate conditions of life, in an
environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity and wellbeing, and he bears a solemn responsibility to protect and
improve the environment for present and future generations.”84
Explicit protections of natural resources for future generations
are incorporated in many international agreements, including the
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development.85 The 1992
Rio Declaration proclaims that humans “are entitled to a healthy
and productive life in harmony with nature” and that the “right to
development must be fulfilled so as to equitably meet
developmental and environmental needs of present and future
generations.”86 Over the past twenty years, sustainability—
which is intended to extend justice across an intergenerational
and global dimension—has become a key policy objective of the
United Nations, the European Union, and many national
governments.87
IV. INTERPRETATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS
The constitutions of many states and nations contain
environmental rights. Up to thirty-one U.S. states and Puerto
81. Weiss, In Fairness, supra note 76, at 22–23.
82. Brett M. Frischmann, Some Thoughts on Shortsightedness and
Intergenerational Equity, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 457, 462 (2005).
83. Ledewitz, supra note 6, at 663.
84. United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm,
Swed., June 5–16, 1972, 3, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1 (1973).
85. See generally Weiss, Intergenerational Equity, supra note 77.
86. United Nations Conference on Environmental Development, Rio de
Janeiro, Braz., June 3–14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development, princs. 1, 3, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I), Annex I
(Aug. 12, 1992).
87. Ekardt, supra note 68, at 65.
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Rico reference the environment or natural resources in their
constitutions.88 Similarly, five dozen countries worldwide have
constitutional provisions purporting to guarantee a fundamental
right to a healthy, adequate, or quality environment.89 An
additional seventy national constitutions contain environmental
policy directives and/or procedural rights,90 which while not
directly enforceable, can influence legislative policy and judicial
interpretation.91
The descriptions of these constitutional environmental rights
are as varied as they are numerous. For instance, the people of
Massachusetts “shall have the right to clean air and water,
freedom from excessive and unnecessary noise, and the natural,
scenic, historic, and esthetic qualities of their environment.”92 In
Michigan, the “conservation and development of the natural
resources of the state are hereby declared to be of paramount
public concern in the interest of the health, safety and general
welfare of the people.”93
In Texas, the “preservation and
conservation of all such natural resources of the State are each
and all hereby declared public rights and duties.”94
In both the sub-national and international context,
environmental provisions of constitutions have rarely been

88. Popovic, supra note 14, at 355. See also, James May & William
Romanowicz, Environmental Rights in State Constitutions, in PRINCIPLES OF
CONSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 305, 306 (James R. May ed., 2011)
(finding that twenty-two states address environmental and natural resources
issues); Janelle P. Eurick, The Constitutional Right to a Healthy Environment:
Enforcing Environmental Protection through State and Federal Constitutions, 11
INT’L LEGAL PERSP. 185, 185 (2001) (finding twenty-one such provisions). The
different figures result from differing definitions of what constitutes
environmental provisions.
89. James R. May & Erin Daly, Constitutional Environmental Rights
Worldwide, in PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 329, 330
(James R. May ed., 2011).
90. James R. May, Constituting Fundamental Environmental Rights
Worldwide, 23 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 113, 114 (2006).
91. See, e.g., May & Daly, supra note 89, at 331 (describing a Greek case in
which a river was saved from being dammed by judicial interpretation of a
policy directive).
92. MASS. CONST. art. XCVII.
93. MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 52.
94. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 59(a).
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subjected to substantive interpretation. 95 This judicial reticence
is due, among other reasons, to concerns about recognizing and
enforcing emerging constitutional features and restraining
economic development and property rights.96 Furthermore, there
are questions of scope. What exactly does “environment” refer to?
Courts are often reluctant to enforce claims to a right with large
Similarly, what degree and
and amorphous boundaries.97
specificity of harm is necessary to satisfy requirements for
standing?98
What degree of environmental degradation is
permissible before a constitutional violation has been effected
and, if a violation is found, what enforcement authority does a
court have to impose a remedy? 99 The difficulty of the challenge
of interpreting and upholding constitutional environmental rights
should not negate the rights, however. Just as “our difficulties in
drawing the parameters of the right to free speech leave
unchallenged our belief in its necessity,”100 so too should
environmental rights be vindicated. Toward this end,
adjudication of explicit constitutional environmental rights
continues to evolve around the world and scholars have identified
a “positive and powerful” trend in which “momentum is only
likely to increase as courts become more comfortable with
environmental rights protection and as environmental pressures
grow.”101
The answers to at least some of the questions presented
above may be elucidated through the traditional modes of
constitutional analysis described by Professor Philip Bobbitt in
his book, Constitutional Fate. 102 Bobbitt described six types of
analysis that the Supreme Court has used, individually and in
combination, in interpreting the Constitution: textual, historical,
doctrinal, prudential, structural, and ethical.103 I will briefly
95. May & Romanowicz, supra note 88, at 307.
96. Id.
97. May & Daly, supra note 89, at 338.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. HISKES, supra note 56, at 40.
101. May & Daly, supra note 89, at 331.
102. See generally PHILIP BOBBITT, Book I: Constitutional
CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 1 (1982).
103. Id.
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introduce each concept here and provide a synopsis of the
application of these modes to substantive due process analysis of
non-textual rights. Where applicable, I will also provide examples
of how the various modes of analysis have been applied to
interpret environmental rights under state and national
constitutions.
Textual arguments are those drawn from a present
understanding – the “fair meaning” – of the words of the
constitution without reference to extrinsic evidence.104 Thus, a
disregard of precedent is permissible because a contemporary
reading of a particular passage may differ from an earlier
understanding of the same text.105 A constraint of the textual
approach, of course, is that “in a Constitution of limited powers
what is not expressed must also be interpreted.”106 In Pedro
Flores v. Corporaciόn del Cobre, Codelco, Chile’s Supreme Court
vindicated a textual constitutional right “to live in an
environment free from contamination” by enjoining the dumping
of copper mill tailings onto Chilean beaches.107
Historical arguments are based on a construction of the
original understanding of a particular constitutional provision by,
for example, referring to statements made by members of a
constitutional convention.108 Proponents of this approach are
seeking “the authoritative reading in a particular context.”109 A
primary shortcoming of this approach in the federal context is the
scarcity of records documenting the full discussion of any given
aspect of the original Constitutional Convention.110 Where
records do exist, they reveal that delegates often approved of
particular language for disparate reasons.111 The Supreme Court
of Illinois relied upon historical analysis when it was called upon
to construe the contours of the constitutional “right to a healthful
104. BOBBITT, supra note 102, at 7, 25, 34. “[T]he interpretation of the text is
the one given by the man in the street.” Id.at 32.
105. Id. at 33.
106. Id. at 38.
107. May & Daly, supra note 89, at 333 (citing CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA
REPÚBLICA DE CHILE [C.P.] art. 19(8)).
108. BOBBITT, supra note 102, at 9, 10.
109. Id. at 13.
110. Id. at 11.
111. Id. at 12.

17

2_VALENTINE FINAL

2015

8/24/2015 12:04 PM

ATMOSPHERIC INTEGRITY

73

environment.”112
Because the meaning of “healthful
environment” was not clear from the constitutional text, the court
looked to the drafting history of the article to conclude that
“‘healthful environment’ was intended to refer to the relationship
between the environment and human health. . . . The right to a
‘healthful environment’ was therefore not intended to include the
protection of endangered and threatened species.”113 Illinois is
representative of the national trend among courts that have
considered the subject and have found that modifiers like
“quality,” “clean,” or “adequate,” protect human uses of natural
resources rather than nature itself.114
Doctrinal arguments are those that assert principles derived
from precedent or from judicial or academic commentary on
precedent (e.g., by reference to Restatements).115 The doctrinal
ideology is a principled approach based on premises of general
applicability “which holds that fairness will result . . . if methods
of judging which all concede are fair are followed
scrupulously.”116
Doctrinal arguments focus more on the
principle involved in a dispute, rather than upon the particular
facts of a case.117 Conceptually, doctrinal arguments would also
seem to incorporate consideration of international norms where
there is an absence of national precedent.
In contrast to doctrinal analysis, prudential arguments tend
to be fact-dependent.118 Prudential arguments come into play
when courts are asked to give effect to competing constitutional

112. Glisson v. City of Marion, 720 N.E.2d 1034, 1042 (Ill. 1999); see also ILL.
CONST. art. XI, § 1 (“The public policy of the State and the duty of each person is
to provide and maintain a healthful environment for the benefit of this and
future generations. The General Assembly shall provide by law for the
implementation and enforcement of this public policy.”); id. § 2 (“Each person
has the right to a healthful environment. Each person may enforce this right
against any party, governmental or private, through appropriate legal
proceedings subject to reasonable limitation and regulation as the General
Assembly may provide by law.”)
113. Glisson, 720 N.E.2d at 1042.
114. May & Romanowicz, supra note 88, at 313.
115. BOBBITT, supra note 102, at 7, 45–52.
116. Id. at 43, 57.
117. Id. at 66, 70.
118. Id.
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provisions.119 Thus, the determination of which text should be
given greater weight is a matter of prudence, which takes
political and economic circumstances into account.120
The
Supreme Court of the Philippines undertook a form of prudential
analysis in a case where it was asked to give meaning to the
nation’s constitutional right to life in combination with a
constitutional policy directive that “[t]he State shall protect and
advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.”121
The court found for the plaintiffs (minor children who sought to
cancel existing timber licenses and stop the issuance of new
ones)122 and determined that the right to a healthful ecology,
coupled with the Philippine constitution’s right to life provision,
imposed “a solemn obligation” on the State to protect both
interests because a failure to do so would condemn future
generations “to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of
sustaining life.”123
Structural arguments are based on the relative powers of
governments (i.e., among different branches of government and
between federal and state governments) as defined by the
Constitution as a whole.124 The relevant text does not refer to
express grants of power or particular prohibitions, but rather to
those passages that, “by setting up structures of a certain kind,
permit us to draw the requirements of the relationship among
structures.”125
Finally, Bobbitt includes ethical arguments, which he
describes as “perhaps controversial” and also as often being “the
animating argumentative factor in constitutional decision-

119. BOBBITT, supra note 102, at 61.
120. Id.
121. See May & Daly, supra note 89, at 334 (quoting CONST. (1987), art. II, sec.
15–16 (Phil.)).
122. Minors Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., G.R. No. 101083, 224 S.C.R.A. 792 (July
30, 1993) (Phil.).
123. May & Daly, supra note 89, at 334 (quoting Minors Oposa v. Factoran Jr.,
G.R. No. 101083, 224 S.C.R.A. 792 (July 30, 1993) (Phil.) (Feliciano, J,
concurring)).
124. BOBBITT, supra note 102, at 74.
125. Id. at 80.
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making.”126 Ethical arguments are not moral arguments in the
sense that certain actions are either right or wrong.127 Rather,
they reflect the character or ethos of the American polity and
compel solutions that comport with “the sort of people we are and
the means we have chosen to solve political and customary
constitutional problems.”128 Ethical arguments may be found in
such notable cases as Moore v. City of East Cleveland,129 Meyer v.
Nebraska,130 and Pierce v. Society of Sisters.131 For example, in
Moore, the Court found that a zoning ordinance that made it
illegal for a grandmother to live with her son and two grandsons
(only one of which was the son’s son) was unconstitutional.132 In
his opinion announcing the judgment of the court, Justice Powell
“placed the decision on an ethical ground.”133 Ethical arguments
give “the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of due process a
scope far exceeding the procedural, common, and historical
understanding of the term.”134 They are “almost” substantive due
process by another name because, “as applied to the analysis of
state actions, ethical constitutional arguments usually appear in
the form of substantive due process because the due process
clause is the textual vehicle by which the ethos of limited
government is applied to the states.”135
126. BOBBITT, supra note 102, at 93.
127. Id. at 94.
128. Id. at 94–95.
129. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
130. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
131. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
132. Moore, 434 U.S. at 496.
133. BOBBITT, supra note 102, at 96; see Moore, 431 U.S. at 503–05 (Justice
Powell noted that, “T]he Constitution protects the sanctity of the family
precisely because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation's
history and tradition. . . . Ours is by no means a tradition limited to respect for
the bonds uniting the members of the nuclear family. The tradition of uncles,
aunts, cousins, and especially grandparents sharing a household along with
parents and children has roots equally venerable and equally deserving of
constitutional recognition. Over the years millions of our citizens have grown up
in just such an environment, and most, surely, have profited from it. Even if
conditions of modern society have brought about a decline in extended family
households, they have not erased the accumulated wisdom of civilization, gained
over the centuries and honored throughout our history, that supports a larger
conception of the family.”).
134. BOBBITT, supra note 102, at 99.
135. Id. at 100.
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Substantive due process analysis refers to the application of
these six traditional modes of analysis to interpretation of the
word “liberty” in the due process clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to identify non-textual fundamental
rights. 136 The existence of unenumerated rights is supported by
the Ninth Amendment, which states, “[t]he enumeration in the
Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or
Rather, the
disparage others retained by the people.”137
enumerated rights “act to give us a constitutional motif, a
cadence of our rights, so that once heard we can supply the rest
on our own.”138
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments provide that no
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law.139 Liberty interests include “the rights to marry;
to have children; to direct the education and upbringing of one’s
children; to marital privacy; to use contraception; to bodily
integrity; and to abortion.”140 The Court is reluctant, though, to
recognize new liberty interests under the doctrine of substantive
due process.141 Accordingly, the Court purports to undertake a
rigorous, two-step analysis. The Court first considers whether
asserted fundamental rights and liberties are “objectively, deeply
rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition . . . and implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty such that neither liberty nor justice
would exist if they were sacrificed.”142 Second, the Court requires
that asserted fundamental liberty interests be carefully
formulated and defined with precise language.143
In the international context, some nations have inferred
environmental rights from other constitutionally entrenched

136. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 944–45 (3rd ed. 2009).
137. U.S. CONST. amend. IX; See also, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
484 (1965).
138. BOBBITT, supra note 102, at 177.
139. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
140. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 US 702, 720 (1997) (internal citations
omitted).
141. Id. at 720.
142. Id. at 720–21 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
143. Id. at 721–23.
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rights. 144 As with rights elucidated through substantive due
process analysis, derivative environmental rights are those that
are not expressed in the text of a constitution, but are found to
reside in another independent constitutional right, such as the
right to life.145 For example, the Supreme Court of India found
that the right to life encompasses a right to a quality
environment.146
In many instances, courts will enlist numerous modes of
constitutional analysis in a single case. For example, in a
dispute147 pitting mining interests against constitutional
provisions stating that residents of Montana have a “right to a
clean and healthful environment”148 and that “[t]he state and
each person shall maintain and improve a clean and healthful
environment in Montana for present and future generations,”149
the Montana Supreme Court considered the state constitution’s
text and structure along with relevant doctrine and history.
Based on its analysis, the court concluded that
[T]he right to a clean and healthful environment is a
fundamental right because it is guaranteed by the Declaration of
Rights found at Article II, Section 3 of Montana’s Constitution,
and that any statute or rule which implicates that right must be
strictly scrutinized and can only survive scrutiny if the State
establishes a compelling state interest and that its action is
closely tailored to effectuate that interest and is the least onerous
path that can be taken to achieve the State’s objective. 150

Montana is, thus, notable for being the first U.S. state to
recognize a fundamental right to a clean and healthful
144. May & Daly, supra note 89, at 332, 335 (describing that derivative
environmental rights are found in nations including India, Bangladesh, Nepal,
and Pakistan).
145. Id. at 335.
146. Id. (The Supreme Court of India explicitly stated that the “[r]ight to life is
a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution and it includes the
right of enjoyment of pollution-free water and air for full enjoyment of life.”
(citing Subhash Kumar v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 420 (India)).
147. Mont. Envtl. Info. Ctr. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 988 P.2d 1236 (Mont.
1999).
148. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 3.
149. Id. art. IX, § 1.
150. Mont. Envtl. Info. Ctr., 988 P.2d at 1246.
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environment. 151 In December 2013, Pennsylvania became the
second state to recognize a similar fundamental right to a quality
environment.152
V. EXPLICATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS IN ROBINSON
TOWNSHIP V. COMMONWEALTH OF
PENNSYLVANIA
A. Overview of the Case
In Robinson Township v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,153
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held in a plurality decision that
public natural resources are protected by the Pennsylvania
Constitution as public trust assets, which the state has a
fiduciary obligation to maintain,154 and also that individuals
cannot be deprived of their substantive due process rights with
regard to their private enjoyment of property in violation of the
Pennsylvania and U.S. Constitutions.155 The case concerned a
statute, Act 13 of 2012, that was intended to, among others
things, permit optimal development of the Commonwealth’s oil
and gas resources.156 Enactment of Act 13 was prompted by
increases in natural gas drilling operations in the Marcellus
Shale Formation in Northeastern Pennsylvania.157 Prior to 2003,
151. Montana has subsequently been reluctant to entertain environmental
rights cases. See, e.g., Lohmeier v. Gallatin Cnty., 135 P.3d 775, 778 (Mont.
2006) (holding that plaintiffs did not establish a violation of their right to a
clean and healthful environment sufficient to give them standing).
152. See generally Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901 (Pa. 2013).
153. Id. at 956–57.
154. See id.
155. Id. at 1008.
156. Id. at 969. Other objectives included protecting the property rights of
people residing in areas hosting oil and gas operations; and protecting natural
resources, environmental rights, and values secured by the Constitution of
Pennsylvania.
157. Id. at 915. The Marcellus Shale Sedimentary Bedrock Formation
straddles portions of Pennsylvania, New York, Ohio, West Virginia, Virginia,
Maryland, New Jersey, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Southern Ontario, Canada
(beneath Lake Erie). Marcellus Shale – Appalachian Basin Natural Gas Play,
GEOLOGY.COM, http://geology.com/articles/marcellus-shale.shtml (last visited
Dec. 14, 2014).
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it was not technologically feasible to sustain industrial-scale
production of natural gas from the formation because of the
limited size and scattered nature of the gas pockets.158 With the
advent of hydraulic fracturing or “fracking” and horizontal
drilling, however, it is now possible to recover natural gas from
unconventional sources on an industrial scale.159
Act 13 revised and re-codified Pennsylvania’s Oil and Gas
Act.160
Two chapters, Chapter 32, which concerns well
permitting, and Chapter 33, which prohibits local regulation of oil
and gas operations, were at issue in the case. Per Chapter 32, the
Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) “shall waive”
requirements for setbacks from sensitive water resources
provided that oil and gas operators submit water protection
plans.161 Industry was further accommodated by Section 3215(d),
which prohibited municipalities from appealing DEP’s decisions
regarding well permits.162
Chapter 33, Local Ordinances Relating to Oil and Gas
Operations, accomplished an unprecedented “displacement of
158. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 914.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 915.
“The new chapters of the Oil and Gas Act are:
Chapter 23, which establishes a fee schedule for the unconventional
gas well industry, and provides for the collection and distribution of
these fees;
Chapter 25, which provides for appropriation and allocation of funds
from the Oil and Gas Lease Fund;
Chapter 27, which creates a natural gas energy development
program to fund public or private projects for converting vehicles to
utilize natural gas fuel;
Chapter 32, which describes the well permitting process and defines
statewide limitations on oil and gas development;
Chapter 33, which prohibits any local regulation of oil and gas
operations, including via environmental legislation, and requires
statewide uniformity among local zoning ordinances with respect to
the development of oil and gas resources; and
Chapter 35, which provides that producers, rather than landowners,
are responsible for payment of the unconventional gas well fees
authorized under Chapter 23.” Id.
161. Id. at 939 (citing 58 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3215(b)(4) (2012)).
162. 58 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3215(d) (“Notwithstanding any other law, no
municipality or storage operator shall have a right of appeal or other form of
review from the [Department of Environmental Protection]’s decision.”).
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prior planning, and derivative expectations, regarding land use,
zoning, and enjoyment of property.”163 Section 3304 established
requirements for uniform local ordinances that “shall allow for
the reasonable development of oil and gas resources.”164
Accordingly, all political subdivisions were required to, among
other things, authorize oil and gas operations as a permitted use
in all zoning districts and were prohibited from imposing any
restrictions on structural height, lighting or noise more stringent
than those presently permitted for industrial uses within the
zoning district. 165 Municipalities were also prohibited from
imposing any “limits or conditions on subterranean operations or
hours of operation of compressor stations and processing plants or
hours of operation for the drilling of oil and gas wells or the
assembly and disassembly of drilling rigs.”166
Act 13 was signed into law on February 14, 2012. In
response, a group of “citizens” filed a petition for review in the
Commonwealth Court seeking a declaration that Act 13 was
unconstitutional and a permanent injunction prohibiting
application of Act 13.167 An en banc panel of the Commonwealth
Court held Act 13 unconstitutional in part and enjoined

163. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 972.
164. 58 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3304(a).
165. Id. § 3304(b)(3), (5).
166. Id. § 3304(b)(10); see also Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 972. The remaining
provisions of Chapter 33 establish enforcement mechanisms. For instance,
Section 3306 authorizes civil actions against municipalities to enjoin
enforcement of local ordinances deemed to be contrary to the provisions of Act 13
or the Commonwealth’s Municipalities Planning Code. 58 PA. CONS. STAT. §
3306. Sections 3307 and 3308 impose significant financial consequences—in the
form of shifting attorneys’ fees and the withholding of unconventional gas well
fees—on local governments that fail to accommodate Act 13. Id. §§ 3307, 3308.
167. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 913–14 (The challengers, or “citizens,” are
several Pennsylvania municipalities, two residents and local officials, the
Delaware Riverkeeper Network, and a physician.).
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application of the implicated sections.168 Both parties169 crossappealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.170
B. Opinion Announcing the Judgment of the Court
(OAJC)
The justices writing the OAJC utilized five171 of Bobbitt’s six
analytical arguments to explicate the citizens’ and state’s rights
and obligations under the Environmental Rights Amendment of
the Pennsylvania Constitution, and also to assess the provisions
of Act 13 against those rights. The Environmental Rights
Amendment, Article 1, Section 27 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution, states that:
The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the
preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of
the environment. Pennsylvania’s public natural resources are the
common property of all the people, including generations yet to
come. As trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth shall
conserve and maintain them for the benefit of all the people.172

Article 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution is the
Commonwealth’s Declaration of Rights, which reserves “certain
inherent and indefeasible rights” to the people.173
Such
fundamental rights “are inherent in man’s nature and preserved
rather than created by the Pennsylvania Constitution.”174
Accordingly, Article 1 rights impose structural limitations on the
power of state government. For example, the General Assembly’s
broad and flexible police power authorizes it to enact laws
168. Id. at 914 (referencing Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 52 A.3d 463,
494 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2012)).
169. The Commonwealth was represented by the Office of the Attorney
General, the Public Utilities Commission, and the Department of
Environmental Protection. Id. at 913–14.
170. Id. In addition to the constitutionality of Act 13, the parties raised claims
concerning standing, ripeness, political question, special laws, and the
separation of powers doctrine.
171. The justices applied structural, textural, historical, doctrinal, and
prudential arguments. See generally Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d 901.
172. PA. CONST. art. 1, § 27.
173. Id. art. 1, § 1.
174. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 948.
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promoting public health, safety, and welfare, but such laws may
not unreasonably infringe upon fundamental rights reserved to
the people.175 It is the duty of courts “to see to it that no right
secured by the supreme law of the land is impaired or destroyed
by legislation.”176
The OAJC began its analysis of how Article 1, Section 27
restrains the exercise of police power by the government by
undertaking a phrase-by phrase assessment of the text of the
constitutional provision as the actual language is popularly
understood.177 In assessing the first clause—”[t]he people have a
right to clean air, pure water, and to the preservation of the
natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environment”—
the court observed that the clause affirms a limitation on the
state’s power to act contrary to this right.178 Moreover, the use of
the word preservation “implicates a holistic analytical approach to
ensure both the protection from harm or damage and to ensure
the maintenance and perpetuation of an environment of quality
for the benefit of future generations.”179 The reservation of this
right in the people places an obligation on state and local
government to refrain from “unduly infringing upon the right”
and upon the judiciary to vindicate Section 27 rights.180 The
court recognized that “clean air” and “pure water” are relative
attributes and, therefore, deference is due to agency expertise in
making determinations about whether standards have been
met.181 Nonetheless, the court set a benchmark for judicial
decisions based on the express purpose of Article 27 that
decisions must provide a “bulwark against actual or likely
degradation of, inter alia, our air and water quality.”182
Consequently, economic development may not proceed at the
“expense of an unreasonable degradation of the environment.”183
175. Id. at 947.
176. Id. at 929 (quoting Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 527–28 (1898)).
177. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 943.
178. Id. at 948.
179. Id. at 951.
180. Id. at 952.
181. Id. at 953.
182. Id (quoting Mont. Envtl. Info. Ctr. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 988 P.2d
1236, 1249 (Mont. 1999)).
183. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 954.
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Rather, the state must exercise its police power “in a manner that
promotes sustainable property use and economic development.”184
The second sentence of Article 27—”Pennsylvania’s public
natural resources are the common property of all the people,
including generations yet to come”—reserves common ownership
of public natural resources in the people, including those living
and those yet to be born.185 Such resources represent the “full
array of resources implicating the public interest,” including
state-owned lands, waterways, and mineral rights, along with
ambient air, surface and ground water, and wild flora and
fauna.186
The final clause—”[a]s trustee of these resources, the
Commonwealth shall conserve and maintain them for the benefit
of all the people”—imposes both negative and affirmative duties
on the Commonwealth.187 The provision establishes that the
Commonwealth, under the public trust doctrine, must manage
the corpus of the trust (public natural resources) for the named
beneficiaries (the people).188 Because the Commonwealth, rather
than the General Assembly, is named as the trustee of public
natural resources, “all existing branches and levels of government
derive constitutional duties and obligations with respect to the
people.”189 The Commonwealth must refrain from acts that
permit or encourage the degradation of public natural
resources.190 The Commonwealth must also act affirmatively to
protect the environment via legislative action.191 In fulfilling
these two obligations, the Commonwealth must be cognizant of
how decisions will impact all beneficiaries, including generations
yet to come.192 The court further noted that these duties “are
tempered by legitimate development tending to improve upon the

184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

Id.
Id.
Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 955.
Id. at 949, 955.
Id. at 956.
Id. at 977.
Id. at 957.
Id. at 958.
Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 959.
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lot of Pennsylvania’s citizenry, with the evident goal of promoting
sustainable development.”193
The court’s textual interpretation of Article 27 is supported
by the amendment’s legislative history. When it was proposed in
the 1969–1970 and 1971–1972 legislative sessions, the
Environmental Rights Amendment received the unanimous
The Environmental Rights
assent of both chambers.194
Amendment grew out of recognition that through centuries of
virtually unrestrained exploitation195 of lumber, game, and coal,
Pennsylvanians had “uglified our land and . . . called it
progress.”196 Aware of this history and the associated financial,
health, and quality of life costs,197 the drafters of the amendment
sought to create a “legally enforceable right to protect and
enhance environmental quality”198 by giving the natural
environment “the same Constitutional protection we give to our
political environment.”199 On May 18, 1971, the voters of
Pennsylvania ratified the proposed amendment by a margin of
nearly four to one.200 The Robinson court concluded that,
through their ratification, the citizens had delegated public trust
duties “concomitantly to all branches and levels of government in
recognition that the quality of the environment is a task with
both local and statewide implications, and to ensure that all
government neither infringed upon the people’s rights nor failed
to act for the benefit of the people.”201 Additionally, the court
observed that “Pennsylvania’s past is the necessary prologue
193. Id. at 958.
194. Id. at 961.
195. Id. at 963.
196. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 961. Pennsylvania’s history of environmental
tragedies include the 1948 Donora smog incident in which corrosive industrial
smoke caused twenty deaths by asphyxiation and sent 7,000 people to the
hospital; the 1959 Knox Mine disaster in which the Susquehanna River
disappeared into a coal vein; the discharge of mine water in 1961 from a Glen
Alden mine that killed more than 300,000 fish; and the Centralia mine fire that
started in 1962 and is still burning (and which led to the relocation of all
residents in 1984).
197. Id. at 963.
198. Id. at 952.
199. Id. at 954
200. Id. at 962.
201. Id. at 963.
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here: the reserved rights, and the concomitant duties and
constraints, embraced by the Environmental Rights Amendment,
are a product of our unique history.”202
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted that nothing in its
precedent offered substantive and controlling guidance with
respect to the type of claims asserted by the citizens in this
case.203 The precedent that did exist weakened the import of the
plain language of the constitution such that the viability of
constitutional environmental claims was limited by whether the
General Assembly had acted and by that body’s policy choices. 204
The court rejected this precedent because it described the
Commonwealth’s obligations in much narrower terms than what
was in the text of Article 27. It assumed that judicial relief is
contingent upon and constrained by legislative action, and, most
significantly, it had “the effect of minimizing the constitutional
duties of executive agencies and the judicial branch, and
circumscribing the abilities of these entities to carry out their
constitutional duties independent of legislative control.”205 The
court asserted that such precedent did not diminish the textual,
organic rights contained in the Environmental Rights
Amendment nor did it preclude the court from recognizing and
enforcing the plain and original understanding of those rights.206
Thus, the court rejected doctrinal arguments based on its
“obligation to vindicate the rights of its citizens where the
circumstances require it and in accordance with the plain
language of the Constitution.”207
202. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 976.
203. Id. at 969.
204. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 950, 955; see also Dernbach, supra note 6, at
696 (“In the first decision, Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield
Tower, the courts held that the Amendment created a self-executing public
right, but that construction of an observation tower overlooking the Gettysburg
Civil War battlefield would not violate that right. Shortly thereafter, in Payne v.
Kassab, the commonwealth court developed a three-part test for applying the
Amendment that utterly ignores the constitutional text, but which has been
widely used ever since. The test is so weak that litigants using it to challenge
environmentally damaging projects are almost always unsuccessful.” (citations
omitted)).
205. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 967.
206. Id. at 969.
207. Id.
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Based on the structural, textual, historical, and doctrinal
arguments described above, the court concluded that
Pennsylvania’s “organic charter . . . now explicitly guarantees the
people’s right to an environment of quality and the concomitant
expressed reservation of a right to benefit from the
Commonwealth’s duty of management of our public natural
resources.”208
In applying the newly explicated rights and obligations to Act
13, the court also considered prudential arguments. The court
was concerned that Act 13 upset the reasonable expectations of
property owners, particularly those who purchased homes in
residential areas with an expectation that the surrounding
environment would continue to be conducive to family life.209
Because Chapter 33 of Act 13 “fundamentally disrupted those
expectations,” the court held that the General Assembly
transgressed its delegated police powers.210 It further held
particular portions of the Act unconstitutional because the
provisions failed to satisfy the constitutional requirements that
the General Assembly protect the corpus of the trust and treat all
beneficiaries equally211 or because the provisions failed to “ensure
compliance with the express command of the Environmental
Rights Amendment that the Commonwealth trustee ‘conserve
and maintain,’ inter alia, the waters of the Commonwealth.”212
C. Concurring Opinion
Justice Max Baer concurred in finding that portions of Act 13
were unconstitutional. He rested his decision, though, on a
finding that these sections violated substantive due process as
defined by precedent (i.e., doctrinal analysis).213 Justice Baer
used substantive due process to vindicate the existing right of

208. Id. at 976.
209. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 977.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 980.
212. Id. at 984.
213. See id. at 1008 (“[B]ecause these statutes force municipalities to enact
zoning ordinances, which violate the substantive due process rights of their
citizenries, they cannot survive constitutional scrutiny.”).
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quiet enjoyment of private property.214
Application of
substantive due process in this fashion protects individuals
against “the exercise of power without any reasonable
justification in the service of a legitimate governmental
objective.”215 That is, the substantive due process guarantee
protects individuals against the arbitrary and oppressive exercise
of government power, regardless of the fairness of procedures
used to implement the government policy.216 Thus, challenges
may be brought to “test whether government regulation of
property is fundamentally rational.”217
As a general rule per Article 1, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the
U.S. Constitution, no person may be deprived of his or her
property rights without due process of law.218 However, private
property owners are subject to certain limitations on their use of
property. The first is the precept sic utere tuo ut alienum non
laedas.219 That is, use your own property as not to injure your
neighbors.220 Zoning ordinances provide another limitation on
the use of private property. Zoning ordinances were first
developed in the early twentieth century “to combat the
complexities of rapidly developing urban and industrial life.”221
In Pennsylvania, as in all states, municipalities derive their
authority to zone from the legislature. Specifically, the
Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code provides that “each
municipality has the authority to enact, amend, and repeal

214. Id. See generally Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
215. Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998).
216. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986).
217. Robin Kundis Craig, Due Process Challenges, in PRINCIPLES OF
CONSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 277, 290 (James R. May ed., 2011) (citing
Lingle v. Chevron USA, Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 542 (2005)).
218. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 1001; see also PA. CONST. art. 1, § 1 (“All men
are born equally free and independent, and have certain inherent and
indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and
liberty, of acquiring, possessing and protecting property and reputation, and of
pursuing their own happiness.”).
219. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 1001.
220. Id. at 931.
221. Id. at 1002 (citing Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386
(1926)).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol32/iss1/2

32

2_VALENTINE FINAL

88

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

8/24/2015 12:04 PM

[Vol. 32

zoning ordinances.”222 As this is a grant of authority from the
legislature to municipal governments, the General Assembly may
withdraw the delegated authority subject to an important
limitation. The withdrawal of a grant of authority must be
constitutionally permissible.223 Thus, the issue for Justice Baer
was, “May the General Assembly, through a law applicable
statewide, remove en toto from local municipalities the apparatus
it provided to vindicate the individual substantive due process
rights of Pennsylvanian landowners?”224 He concluded that “once
a state authorizes political subdivisions to zone for the best
interests of the health, safety and character of their communities,
and zoning ordinances are enacted and relied upon by the
residents of a community, the state may not alter or invalidate
those ordinances, given their constitutional underpinning.”225
Justice Baer began his analysis by noting that in a “run of
the mill” zoning case, a citizen challenges a local zoning
ordinance as violating his or her property rights without due
process of law.226 A challenger will succeed only if he or she can
show that the government’s interference with the property
owner’s right to enjoyment of his or her land does not bear “a
substantial relationship to the health, safety, morals, or general
welfare of the community.”227 Act 13, however, is unlike a typical
zoning ordinance. Rather than limiting use of private property,
Act 13 expands private property rights by mandating that
municipalities permit residential and agricultural property
owners to bring oil and gas operations onto their land.228
Consequently, the government intrusion is not upon the
landowner who wishes to have oil and gas operations on his or
her property, but upon that landowner’s neighbors.229 Thus, “the
222. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 1002 (quoting Hoffman Mining Co. v. Zoning
Hearing Bd. of Adams Twp., 32 A.3d 587, 603 (Pa. 2011)).
223. Id. at 1006.
224. Id. at 1002.
225. Id. at 1006. (internal quotations and citations omitted, emphasis in the
original).
226. Id. at 1004.
227. Id. at 1003 (quoting Surrick v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 382 A.2d 105, 108
(Pa. 1977)).
228. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 1005.
229. Id.
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General Assembly is mandating that municipalities pass land-use
and zoning ordinances, which permit landowners, statewide, to
violate sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas”230 and which fail to
provide impacted neighbors with “any remedy when the
inevitable damage to the enjoyment of private property
occurs.”231
Federal case law teaches that constitutionally valid zoning
“is to be determined . . . by considering [the restriction] in
connection with the circumstances and the locality”232 and that
“[l]and-use restrictions designate districts in which only
compatible uses are allowed and incompatible uses are
excluded.”233 Act 13 directly contradicts these edicts. That is, Act
13 “violates substantive due process because it does not protect
the interests of neighboring property owners from harm, alters
the character of neighborhoods and makes irrational
classifications” (e.g., it requires municipalities to allow drilling
operations and the use of explosives in all zoning districts).234
Contrary to Village of Euclid, “Sections 3215(b)(4) and (d), 3303,
and 3304 not only allow entry of the pigs into the parlor, but
further decree that local governments enact zoning ordinances
that expressly permit those intrusions, without exception.”235
For all of the reasons stated above, the lead and concurring
opinions held that sections 3215(b)(4) and (d), 3303, and 3304 of
Act 13 are unconstitutional.236 Additionally, the court enjoined
certain specified parts of chapters 32 and 33, which implement or
enforce these invalidated provisions.237 The lead opinion further
directed the General Assembly to exercise its power in a manner
that reasonably accounts for the environmental features of

230. Id.
231. Id. at 1008.
232. Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926).
233. City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 514 U.S. 725, 732 (1995) (internal
quotes omitted).
234. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 1006.
235. Id. at 1008; see also Vill. of Euclid, 272 U.S. at 388 (“A nuisance may be
merely a right thing in the wrong place, like a pig in the parlor instead of the
barnyard.”).
236. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 1008.
237. Id. at 916.
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affected locales in accordance with principles of sustainable
development.238
IV. A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO ATMOSPHERIC
INTEGRITY
Both Montana and Pennsylvania have constitutional text
explicitly reserving a fundamental environmental right in the
people. Despite the lack of corresponding text in the U.S.
Constitution, the genesis of a federal right to atmospheric
integrity may be found through historical, doctrinal, prudential,
structural, and ethical analysis. I will begin, though, with a few
words about the lack of textual support for a right to atmospheric
integrity in the U.S. Constitution.
A. Text
Clearly, there is no explicit mention of atmospheric integrity
in the U.S. Constitution.239 This absence is likely due to the
founding fathers’ inability to imagine a world transformed by
human activity. One commentator described the drafters of the
Bill of Rights as “ecologically ignorant.”240 Certainly, the state of
scientific knowledge in 1791 was less advanced than it is today.
However, there is evidence that James Madison at least
considered human impacts on the environment: “[I]t is difficult to
believe that it lies with [mankind] so to remodel the work of
nature as it would be remodelled [sic], by a destruction not only of
individuals, but of entire species.”241 Madison insisted that the
laws of nature forbade the destruction of entire species.242
238. Id. at 981.
239. Over the years, there have been unsuccessful attempts to add
environmental rights to the constitution. See generally Carole L. Gallagher, The
Movement to Create an Environmental Bill of Rights: From Earth Day, 1970 to
the Present, 9 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 107 (1997); Robin Kundis Craig, Should
there be a Constitutional Right to a Clean/Healthy Environment?, 34 ENVTL. L.
REP. 11013 (2004).
240. Freyfogle, supra note 12, at 160.
241. John F. Hart, Fish, Dams, and James Madison: Eighteenth-Century
Species Protection and the Original Understanding of the Takings Clause, 63
MD. L. REV. 287, 316 (2004).
242. Id. at 291.

35

2_VALENTINE FINAL

2015

8/24/2015 12:04 PM

ATMOSPHERIC INTEGRITY

91

Whatever the drafters’ actual knowledge, given that the purpose
of the constitution is to provide for society’s orderly progression
through time “to ourselves and our posterity,” 243 it can be
presumed that the founders believed that the physical world
would and should remain in a state hospitable to human life.
B. History
As noted above, historical arguments are based on a
construction of the original understanding of a particular
constitutional provision. Where there is an absence of an explicit
provision, one can look to the historical understanding of a
concept. For example, when asked to determine whether a law
prohibiting assisted suicide violated Due Process, the Court
examined “our Nation’s history, legal traditions, and
practices.”244 I concede that it would be futile to assert that our
nation has a history and legal tradition of atmospheric protection
beyond those protections afforded by the Clean Air Act. If one
considers that atmospheric integrity is essential for human
subsistence, however, the question becomes whether our nation
has a history of recognizing intergenerational responsibility. I
assert that conceptions of intergenerational responsibility can be
traced back to ancient Greece and take the form of both an
obligation to refrain from unduly burdening future generations
and to pass along to posterity a better, more stable society.
During Aristotle’s time, every Athenian who wished to
become a citizen was required to take an oath which stated, in
relevant part, “[m]y native land I will not leave a diminished
heritage but greater and better than when I received it.”245 The
concept of intergenerational responsibility was also expressed in
Roman law nearly 1,500 years ago. The text of the Institutes of
Justinian declared that, “[b]y the laws of nature, these things are
common to mankind – the air, running water, the sea, and
243. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
244. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 710 (1997).
245. John Wilson Taylor, The Athenian Ephebic Oath, 13 THE CLASSICAL
JOURNAL 495, 499 (1918), available at, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3287904.
Aristotle
lived
from
384–322
B.C.E.
Aristotle,
HISTORY.COM,
http://www.history.com/topics/ancient-history/aristotle (last visited Dec. 20,
2014).
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consequently the shores of the sea.”246
This ancient
pronouncement provides the foundation of the Public Trust
Doctrine, which holds that the sovereign (i.e., the state) holds
shared resources—the jus publicum—in trust for the public.
Trustees have a fundamental, common law duty to preserve and
maintain trust assets for both present and future beneficiaries of
the trust.247
Expressions of intergenerational obligations may also be
found in American political discourse from the very earliest days
of the union up until the present. For example, John Adams
wrote that he studied the useful science of government so that his
grandchildren could pursue more cultured disciplines, such as
painting and poetry.248 Thomas Jefferson and James Madison
also documented their thoughts on intergenerational obligations.
Using land as an analogy for debt and civil law, Jefferson wrote
to Madison,
I set out on this ground, which I suppose to be self evident, ‘that
the earth belongs in usufruct to the living;’ that the dead have
neither powers nor rights over it. The portion occupied by an
246. JUSTINIAN, THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN 158 (Thomas Collett Sandars ed.
& trans., 1st Am. ed. 1876) (emphasis added). The Institutes of Justinian is one
of three fundamental works of jurisprudence issued from 533 to 534 A.D by
order of the Eastern Roman Emperor Justinian I. Collectively, the works were
intended to be the sole source of Roman law. Roman law provides the foundation
for our own Western legal tradition. See John W. Head, Codes, Cultures, Chaos,
and Champions: Common Features of Legal Codification Experiences in China,
Europe, and North America, 13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 1, 38–39 (2003).
247. Mary C. Wood, Atmospheric Trust Litigation Across the World, in
FIDUCIARY DUTY AND THE ATMOSPHERIC TRUST 99, 106, 109 n.59 (Ken Coghill et
al. eds., 2012).
248. Letter from John Adams to Abigail Adams (May 12, 1780) (on file with in
Adams Family Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society), available at
http://www.masshist.org/digitaladams/archive/doc?id=L17800512jasecond&bc=
%2Fdigitaladams%2Farchive%2Fbrowse%2Fletters_1779_1789.php
(“The
Science of Government it is my Duty to study, more than all other Studies
Sciences: the Art of Legislation and Administration and Negotiation, ought to
take Place, indeed to exclude in a manner all other Arts. I must study Politicks
and War that my sons may have liberty to study Painting and Poetry
Mathematicks and Philosophy. My sons ought to study Mathematicks and
Philosophy, Geography, natural History, Naval Architecture, navigation,
Commerce and Agriculture, in order to give their Children a right to study
Painting, Poetry, Musick, Architecture, Statuary, Tapestry and Porcelaine.”
(alterations in original)).
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individual ceases to be his when himself ceases to be, and reverts
to the society. . . . Then no man can by natural right oblige the
lands he occupied, or the persons who succeed him in that
occupation, to the paiment [sic] of debts contracted by him. For if
he could, he might during his own life, eat up the usufruct of the
lands for several generations to come, and then the lands would
belong to the dead, and not to the living, which would be reverse
of our principle.249

Jefferson went on to assert that the current generation may
not burden future generations with debt or with a perpetual
constitution. He stated that a nation should not contract more
debt that it can repay within a generation (the duration of which
he calculated to be nineteen years).250 Similarly, he declared
that, “[e]very constitution, then, and every law, naturally expires
at the end of 19 years.”251 In response, Madison attacked each of
Jefferson’s proposals on practical grounds while generally
accepting Jefferson’s objective to make constitutions sensitive to
the majority will of each successive generation because, to do
otherwise, would be “an act of force and not of right.”252 Madison
observed that obligations may, indeed, pass from one generation
to the next, but stipulated that future generations should not be
unduly burdened by contemporary decisions.253 He wrote, “it
would give me singular pleasure to see it first announced to the
world in a law of the U. States, and always kept in view as a
249. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON DIGITAL EDITION (Barbara B. Oberg & J. Jefferson
Looney eds., 2008) (hereinafter “Letter Sept. 6, 1789”). Usufruct refers to “the
legal right of using and enjoying the fruits or profits of something belonging to
another.” WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1299 (1984).
250. Letter Sept. 6, 1789, supra note 249.
251. Id.
252. ADRIENNE KOCH, JEFFERSON AND MADISON: THE GREAT COLLABORATION 70,
73 (1950) (quoting Letter Sept. 6, 1789, supra note 249).
253. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Feb. 4, 1790), in 5 THE
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 437, 439, 441 (Gaillard Hunt, ed., 1904), available
at http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/1937#lf1356-05_head_163 (“There seems, then,
to be some foundation in the nature of things; in the relation which one
generation bears to another, for the descent of obligations from one to another.
Equity may require it. Mutual good may be promoted by it. And all that seems
indispensable in stating the account between the dead and the living, is to see
that the debts against the latter do not exceed the advances made by the
former.”).
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Thomas Paine similarly wrote in 1792 that,

8/24/2015 12:04 PM

[Vol. 32
unjust

&

The Parliament or the people of 1688 . . . had no more right to
dispose of the people of the present day, or to bind or to control
them in any shape whatever, than the Parliament or the people of
the present day have to dispose of, bind, or control those who are
to live a hundred or a thousand years hence. 255

Jefferson, Madison, and Paine were all writing in a political
context. It is not too far of a stretch to assert, though, that their
command that one generation not unduly burden another is
applicable to the nation’s response to climate change. Failure to
act now to reduce atmospheric levels of greenhouse gases to levels
compatible with climate stability will indeed “bind or control
those who are to live a hundred or a thousand years hence.”256
Nearly fifty years after Paine wrote The Rights of Man,
Abraham Lincoln spoke to a group of students about positive
responsibilities toward future generations. Specifically, he noted
the duty
to transmit [goodly land and a political edifice of liberty and
equal rights], the former, unprofaned by the foot of an invader;
the latter, undecayed by the lapse of time and untorn by
usurpation, to the latest generation that fate shall permit the
world to know. This task gratitude to our fathers, justice to
ourselves, duty to posterity, and love for our species in general,
all imperatively require us faithfully to perform.257

President Barack Obama, likewise, invoked our society’s
responsibility to future generations in his 2014 State of the Union
Address. He stated, “when our children’s children look us in the
eye and ask if we did all we could to leave them a safer, more
254. Id. at 441 (emphasis in original).
255. THOMAS PAINE, THE RIGHTS OF MAN: BEING AN ANSWER TO MR. BURKE'S
ATTACK ON THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 13 (Eckler 1892) (emphasis in original).
256. PAINE, supra note 255, at 13.
257. Abraham Lincoln, The Perpetuation of Our Political Institutions: Address
before the Young Men’s Lyceum of Springfield, Illinois (Jan. 27, 1838), available
at http://patriotpost.us/documents/57 (last visited Oct. 4, 2014).
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stable world, with new sources of energy, I want us to be able to
say yes, we did.”258
History and current discourse thus
demonstrate both an obligation to refrain from unduly burdening
future generations and to pass along a stronger, more stable
society.
History also tells us that Madison and his contemporaries
accepted regulation of natural resources, specifically laws that
required mill dam operators to accommodate migratory fish, as
being broadly aimed at public utility and beneficial to the
community at large.259 This perception is at odds with modern
case law concerning regulatory takings.260 During Madison’s
time, there was “wide consensus among contemporary legislators
that the constitutional rights of affected landowners were not
violated by accommodating the public’s interest in natural
abundance, instead of sacrificing the public good in order to
maximize the value of private property.”261 Accordingly, the fishpassage laws and the broader concern for the public utility of
natural resources that they reflect should be “recognized as part
of the American legal tradition that was already established
when the Constitution and the Bill of Rights were adopted.”262 In
other words, “the history of the early fish-passage laws should
lead the Court to affirm ‘the constitutional power of the State to
insist that its natural advantages shall remain unimpaired by its
citizens’ in the context of habitat preservation laws”263, including
climate change laws and regulations.
C. Doctrine
Doctrinal arguments for constitutional rights are derived
from precedent or from commentary on precedent. Admittedly,
U.S. precedent supporting a constitutional environmental right is
258. President Barack Obama’s State of the Union Address, THE WHITE HOUSE
(Jan.
28,
2014),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/28/
president-barack-obamas-state-union-address.
259. Hart, supra note 241, at 315.
260. See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
261. Hart, supra note 241, at 289.
262. Id. at 290.
263. Id. at 317 (quoting Hudson Cnty. Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349,
356–57(1908) (Holmes, J. delivered the opinion of the court)).
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poor. Federal courts have consistently found that there are no
constitutionally-protected environmental rights pursuant to the
Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments.264 At least one
federal court, however, has expressed its opinion that
constitutional recognition of a fundamental right to
environmental integrity may one day be recognized. In response
to a cause of action claiming that,
[t]he right to enjoy the beauty of God’s creation, and to live in an
environment that preserves the unquantified amenities of life, is
part of the liberty protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution of the United States . . . and is
also one of those unenumerated rights retained by the people . . .
as provided in the Ninth Amendment, 265

the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas
stated that “[s]uch claims, even under our present Constitution,
are not fanciful and may, indeed, some day, in one way or
another, obtain judicial recognition.”266 The court went on to
state, however, that the plaintiffs had “not stated facts which
would under the present state of the law constitute a violation of
their constitutional rights.”267 Similarly, in a dissent to an
opinion268 that denied standing to the Sierra Club to challenge
the development of a ski resort in the Sierra Nevada Mountains,
Justice Douglas implicitly recognized a basic right to a clean and
healthy environment.269 These sympathetic responses indicate
264. Gallagher, supra note 239, at 117.
265. Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng’rs of U. S. Army, 325 F. Supp. 728,
739 (D. Ark. 1971).
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 741–42 (1972) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
269. Gallagher, supra note 239, at 110. In another case, Environmental
Defense Fund Inc. v. Hoerner Waldorf Corp., a federal judge wrote, “I have no
difficulty in finding that the right to life and liberty and property are
constitutionally protected. Indeed the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
provide that these rights may not be denied without due process of law, and
surely a person's health is what, in a most significant degree, sustains life. So it
seems to me that each of us is constitutionally protected in our natural and
personal state of life and health. But the constitutional protection is against
governmental action either federal or state.” Envtl. Def. Fund Inc. v. Hoerner
Waldorf Corp., 3 ENVTL. L. REP. 20794, 20794 (D. Mont. 1970). As plaintiffs
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that the notion of a fundamental right to environmental integrity
is not without merit.
As demonstrated by the holding in Robinson Township,
precedent can be rejected, particularly when courts accept
historical evidence of constitutional intent. After all, the doctrine
of stare decisis is not an inexorable command.270 The court in
Robinson Township looked to the legislative history of the
Environmental Rights Amendment to determine that legislators
and citizens intended that article 1, section 27 should compel the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to exercise its police power in a
manner that fosters sustainable development while respecting
the reserved rights of the people to a clean, healthy, and
esthetically-pleasing environment.271 Similarly, courts should
consider that James Madison—the author of the Bill of Rights,
including the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment—accepted
regulation of natural resources on private property for the benefit
of the community at large. 272 Correctly understood, then, the
takings clause should not be read as an impediment to the
protection of environmental quality in the name of the public
good.
Courts are not strictly limited to domestic precedent,
however. They may look to international law for respected
reasoning and guidance. Per the authority of the Supremacy
Clause,273 the Supreme Court has stated that “[i]nternational law
is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by
the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction as often as
questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their
determination” and that courts should refer to “customs and
usages of [c]ivilized nations, . . . not for . . . speculations . . .
concerning what the law ought to be, but for trustworthy evidence
of what the law really is.”274
Indirect incorporation of
international law is an established and appropriate means of
alleged no federal or state action in their pleadings, however, the opinion fell
short of recognizing constitutionally-protected rights to a clean and healthful
environment. Id.; see also Gallagher, supra note 239, at 113–14.
270. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 560 (2003).
271. See generally, Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901 (Pa. 2013).
272. Hart, supra note 241, at 315.
273. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
274. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
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guiding, interpreting and applying domestic law, particularly
with regard to the broad, normative standards set by
international human rights law.275 In fact, “[o]ver the years, a
growing number of federal and state courts have referred
explicitly to the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration [of
Human Rights] and other international human rights
instruments to determine the content and contours of various
rights guaranteed by U.S. law.”276
There has been a “greening” of international human rights
law such that human rights courts and treaty bodies are seeing
an increase in environmental cases implicating human rights.277
“Human rights law does not protect the environment per se.”278
Rather, “the right to private life, or the right to life, can be used
to compel governments to regulate environmental risks, enforce
environmental laws, or disclose environmental information.”279
The Office for the High Commissioner on Human Rights reported
in 2009 that:
[w]hile the universal human rights treaties do not refer to a
specific right to a safe and healthy environment, the United
Nations human rights treaty bodies all recognize the intrinsic
link between the environment and the realization of a range of
human rights, such as the right to life, to health, to food, to
water, and to housing.280

275. HISKES, supra note 56, at 7 (“the concepts of human rights have
increasingly been accepted as norms governing the behavior of states.”); Nickel,
supra note 65, at 285; Popovic, supra note 14, at 373.
276. Popovic, supra note 14, at 369 (quoting Richard B. Lillich, The
Constitution and International Human Rights, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 851, 859–60
(1989)); see, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 554 (2005) (The Court looked
to international law for guidance and determined that, “[t]he overwhelming
weight of international opinion against the juvenile death penalty is not
controlling here, but provides respected and significant confirmation for the
Court's determination that the penalty is disproportionate punishment for
offenders under 18.”).
277. Boyle, supra note 16, at 614.
278. Id. at 615.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 617 (citing U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the OHCHR on the
Relationship Between Climate Change and Human Rights, ¶ 18, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/10/61 (Jan. 15, 2009)).
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Thus, in considering whether there is a right to atmospheric
integrity, courts should consider that international human rights
instruments, such as the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights281 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social,
and Cultural Rights,282 protect fundamental rights as well as the
basic necessities of life that are threatened by catastrophic
climate change. Under international law, the United States has
assumed obligations to respect, protect, and fulfill human
rights.283 These responsibilities would be further heightened if
the Court were to recognize a right to atmospheric integrity as an
emergent human right.284
Additionally,
courts
should
consider
international
environmental declarations and conventions, including the 1972
Stockholm Declaration of the Human Environment,285 the 1992
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development,286 and the
1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC).287 By considering both international human rights
and environmental law, courts may incorporate respect for basic
and human rights, environmental integrity, and economic
development into their decisions.288
D. Prudence
Prudential arguments take political and economic
circumstances into account. Given the overwhelming evidence
that human-caused climate change is imposing “current impacts
with significant costs and extraordinary future risks to society
281. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) (establishing the right to life, liberty and security
of person).
282. International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, G.A.
Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/RES/2200A(XXI) (Jan. 3, 1976) The U.S. has
signed, but not ratified the resolution..
283. What are Human Rights, UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS,
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Pages/WhatareHumanRights.aspx (last visited
Dec. 20, 2014).
284. See supra notes 69–75 and accompanying text.
285. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
286. See supra notes 85–86 and accompanying text.
287. See supra notes 46–49 and accompanying text.
288. See Boyle, supra note 16, at 627.
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and natural systems,”289 and that the costs of inaction greatly
outweigh the costs of reducing greenhouse gas emissions,290 the
prudent course of action is to start reducing emissions
immediately. A 2006 study revealed “[t]he benefits of strong,
early action on climate change outweigh the costs.”291 In
particular, the report estimated that failure to mitigate climate
change will cost at least five percent—and maybe as much as
twenty percent—of global gross domestic product (GDP) each
year, “now and forever.”292 Ignoring climate change will damage
economic growth and potentially create risks of major disruption
to economic and social activity.293 As temperatures increase,
aggregate economic damages will accelerate.294 Climate change
is projected to slow economic growth, hinder poverty reduction
efforts, erode food security, and prolong existing and create new
poverty traps, particularly in urban areas and emerging hunger
hotspots.295
Alternatively, the cost of reducing emissions (i.e., mitigation)
could be limited to one percent of global GDP each year.296
Mitigation, with opportunities for growth and development along
the way, therefore, represents a wise investment.297 Effective
early action is “the pro-growth strategy for the longer term, and it
can be done in a way that does not cap the aspirations for growth
of rich or poor countries.”298 Thus, climate science299 and
economic analysis both provide prudential arguments for
immediate action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
289. AAAS, supra note 1, at 1.
290. NICHOLAS STERN, STERN REVIEW: THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE, at
vi (2006).
291. STERN, supra note 290, at i.
292. Id. at vi.
293. Id. at ii.
294. IPCC 2014, supra note 1, at 13.
295. Id. at 21.
296. STERN, supra note 290, at vi.
297. Id. at i.
298. Id. at viii; cf. Independence Hall Ass’n, The Electric Ben Franklin,
USHISTORY.ORG, http://www.ushistory.org/franklin/quotable/quote67.htm (last
visited Mar. 30, 2014). This argument may also be phrased in terms of an
historical argument by referencing Benjamin Franklin’s famous adage that an
ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.
299. See supra Part II.
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E. Ethical
Ethical arguments reflect the character or ethos of the
American polity and compel solutions that comport with “the sort
of people we are.”300 The American identity is defined largely by
individualism.301 This notion must be tempered, however, by our
nation’s Judeo-Christian heritage, which teaches social
responsibility. For example, Jewish theology teaches that there
are ethical obligations for the living to “live equitably within the
boundaries of what the Earth can sustain” and an obligation to
extend that process to generations of humans and nonhumans
Christian teachings similarly invite
still unborn. 302
environmental stewardship. For example, A Southern Baptist
Declaration on the Environment and Climate Change invokes
scripture to motivate climate action: “We must care about
environmental and climate issues because we are called to love
our neighbors, to do unto others as we would have them do unto
us and to protect and care for the ‘least of these.’”303 Likewise,
Catholic teachings indicate that “creation is the beginning and
the foundation of all God’s works” and, consequently, “[t]he
environment must be seen as God’s gift to all people, and the use
we make of it entails a shared responsibility for all humanity,
especially the poor and future generations.”304
I include these references here not to blur the line between
church and state. Rather, I seek to demonstrate that accepting
shared responsibility for the physical world and vulnerable
populations, including those yet to be born, is consistent with

300. BOBBITT, supra note 102, at 95.
301. Freyfogle, supra note 12, at 170.
302. Lawrence Troster, Judaism, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SUSTAINABILITY,
VOL. 1: THE SPIRIT OF SUSTAINABILITY 255 (Willis Jenkins, ed. 2010).
303. A Southern Baptist Declaration on the Environment and Climate Change,
SOUTHERN BAPTIST ENVIRONMENT & CLIMATE INITIATIVE, http://www.baptist
creationcare.org/node/1 (last visited Mar. 30, 2014) (citing Matthew 22:34–40;
7:12; 25:31–46).
304. Pope Benedict XVI, Message of His Holiness Pope Benedict XVI for the
Celebration of World Peace Day (Jan. 1, 2010) (transcript available at
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/messages/peace/documents/hf_b
en-xvi_mes_20091208_xliii-world-day-peace_en.html#_edn1 (last visited Dec. 20,
2014)).
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“millennia of moral teaching.”305 In Bowers v. Hardwick, Justice
Burger observed in a concurring opinion that “[t]o hold that the
act of homosexual sodomy is somehow protected as a fundamental
right would be to cast aside millennia of moral teaching.”306
While Bowers was overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, Justice
Burger’s reasoning is relevant to the articulation of a right to
atmospheric integrity.307 Concern for the well-being of creation
and vulnerable populations is “firmly rooted in Judeo-Christian
moral and ethical standards”308 of Western civilization and, thus
defines “the sort of people we are.”309 Furthermore, the Lawrence
court reasoned that changes in the laws and traditions of the past
fifty years were of greater relevance and “show[ed] an emerging
awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to adult
persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters
pertaining to sex.”310 There has been no comparable change in
Judeo-Christian attitudes toward social responsibility: the
millennia of moral teachings continue to be affirmed.311
Additionally, concepts of intergenerational equity have “deep
roots in the religious, cultural, and legal traditions of the

305. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 197 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
306. Id.
307. Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558.
308. Id. at 196 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
309. BOBBITT, supra note 102, at 94–95.
310. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572.
311. Philip Pullella, Pope Francis Preparing Encyclical on the Environment,
Vatican says, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 24, 2014, 7:28 PM), http://www.huffington
post.com/2014/01/25/pope-francis-envionment_n_4662499.html (“[Pope Francis,]
who took his name from the saint seen as the patron of the animals and the
environment, is writing an encyclical on man's relationship with nature.”). See
also, Peter Adriance, Faith Communities Stress Moral Dimension of Carbon
Pollution at EPA, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 12, 2014, 12:50 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/peter-adriance/faith-communities-stress-_b_47
69649.html; see generally CATHOLIC CLIMATE COVENANT, http://catholicclimate
covenant.org/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2014); Mission & History, INTERFAITH POWER
& LIGHT, http://www.interfaithpowerandlight.org/about/mission-history/ (last
visited Dec. 20, 2014) (stating that Interfaith Power & Light seeks to combat
global warming through the promotion of energy conservation, energy efficiency,
and renewable energy); About GreenFaith, GREENFAITH, http://greenfaith.org/
about (last visited Dec. 20, 2014).
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world.”312 As such, the concept is also familiar to Americans from
non-Judeo-Christian backgrounds.
F. Structural
The legislative, executive, and judicial branches are co-equal
branches of government. Within this scheme, it is “emphatically
the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the
law is.”313 Thus, the Supreme Court has the authority to
articulate constitutional rights. Once such rights are recognized,
it is also the judiciary’s duty to “to see to it that no right secured
by the supreme law of the land is impaired or destroyed by
legislation.”314 Courts are thus “uniquely qualified to recognize
and safeguard important principles and values.”315
The right to atmospheric integrity such that the climate does
not shift beyond the relatively stable range of the Holocene epoch
(i.e., the last 10,000 years) during which modern human society
has evolved is surely an important value worth safeguarding. The
current Congress is ineffective, if not outright hostile, in its
efforts to craft a meaningful response to climate change. There is
a profound disconnect between scientific knowledge and public
perception about the risk of highly damaging impacts of climate
change.316 Ninety-seven percent of climate scientists agree that
human-caused climate change is occurring.317 In light of this
strong degree of scientific consensus, it is astounding that over
half of the Republican members of the House of Representatives
(fifty-five percent) and Senate (sixty-six percent) reject human-

312. Weiss, Intergenerational Equity, supra note 77, at 8–9 (citing Islamic law,
Judeo-Christian tradition, European and American civil law, socialist legal
tradition, African customary law, and non-theistic traditions, such as Shinto).
313. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
314. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 528 (1898), overruled by Fed. Power
Comm’n v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575 (1942).
315. Dernbach, supra note 6, at 733.
316. AAAS, supra note 1, at 3.
317. Emily Atkin, This One Simple Graphic Explains the Difference Between
Climate Science and Climate Politics, CLIMATE PROGRESS (Mar. 27, 2014, 1:38
PM),
http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2014/03/27/3419542/climate-science-vsclimate-politics-graphic/ (“[O]f 10,855 climate studies published in peer-reviewed
journals during 2013, 2 rejected anthropogenic global warming.”).
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cause climate change.318 Consequently, there is little hope for an
effective response to climate change from current federal
legislators.
The executive branch has a more positive record on climate
change319 and is currently developing regulations to limit
emissions from power plants per its authority under the Clean
Air Act.320 The executive branch’s efforts alone are inadequate to
meet the scope of the challenge presented by climate change,
however. Into this void, the Court may establish a constitutional
right to atmospheric integrity based on the arguments presented
here.
Once established, it would be the duty of the legislative and
executive branches to create and implement a coherent strategy
for action that incorporates consideration for atmospheric
integrity into all governmental decisions.321 The courts would
retain responsibility for weighing the protection of atmospheric
integrity against other equally valid and necessary constitutional
protections, particularly property rights. The end result will
necessarily be, as in Robinson Township, an emphasis on
sustainable development wherein economic development must be
reconciled with natural resources protection.
In vindicating a constitutional right to atmospheric integrity,
the judiciary could impose requirements for 1) production of a
national climate recovery plan to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions nationwide at a rate of six percent per year, and 2) an
annual accounting from the federal government in which the
executive branch documents the nation’s annual emissions and
progress toward reaching the six percent per year reduction
318. Id.
319. See e.g., Preparing the United States for the Impacts of Climate Change,
Exec. Order No. 13,653, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,819 (Nov. 6, 2013); U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,
UNITES STATES CLIMATE ACTION REPORT 2014 (2014); EXEC. OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, THE PRESIDENT’S CLIMATE ACTION PLAN (2013), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/image/president27sclimateactionpl
an.pdf.
320. See Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse
Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496, 66,496
(Dec. 15, 2009) (“The Administrator finds that six greenhouse gases taken in
combination endanger both the public health and the public welfare of current
and future generations.”); see also Adriance, supra note 311.
321. See Dernbach, supra note 6, at 726.
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target.322 Given the necessary requirements for oversight and
scientific literacy that such an equitable solution would require,
the judiciary may want to establish a specialized climate court to
handle the complicated task.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Court has recognized that “the full scope of the liberty
guaranteed by the Due Process Clause cannot be found in or
limited by the precise terms of the specific guarantees elsewhere
Indeed, the Court has
provided in the Constitution.”323
repeatedly recognized new fundamental liberty rights.324 It is
now time for the Court to recognize a right to atmospheric
integrity. Our nation’s history, traditions, and ethos provide
evidence of “deeply rooted”325 intergenerational obligations,
which impose both positive and negative duties on the present
generation (i.e., do not unduly burden future generations and
provide a strong, more stable society for future generations).
Precedent embraces the precept that property rights must be
exercised in such as manner as not to injure neighbors (i.e., sic
utere tuo ut alienum non laedas). If one considers neighbors in
time, as well as neighbors in geographic space, the same principle
may be used to restrain current exploitation of carbon resources.
Additionally, international law reflects broad, normative
standards that human rights, environmental integrity, and
economic development should be balanced. Also, more than half of
the world’s constitutions—and nearly all that have been adopted
since 1972—include a constitutional provision regarding
environmental quality.326 The international trend is, thus,
toward greater legal recognition of environmental rights.

322. See National Greenhouse Gas Emissions Data, EPA (Apr. 5, 2014),
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/usinventoryreport.html (stating
that the EPA currently maintains an inventory of total annual U.S. greenhouse
gas emissions and removals).
323. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977).
324. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
325. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997).
326. May, supra note 90, at 114; see also, Dernbach, supra note 6, at 697
(“Nearly all national constitutions adopted or revised since 1972 have included a
constitutional right to a decent environment.”).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol32/iss1/2

50

2_VALENTINE FINAL

106

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

8/24/2015 12:04 PM

[Vol. 32

Science and economics indicate that the prudent course
forward—in order to maintain a world in which liberty and
justice are possible327—is to immediately begin reducing
greenhouse gas emissions. Science also provides a “careful
description”328 to orient policymakers in their efforts to protect
the asserted right. That is, returning to a concentration of less
than or equal to 350 ppm of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere will
likely “stabilize climate without further global warming.”329
Thus, once a right to atmospheric integrity is established by the
Court, under its duty to “say what the law is,”330 annual targets
are available as “guideposts for responsible decisionmaking”331 by
the judicial, executive, and legislative branches, as well as by the
private sector.
By securing a fundamental right to atmospheric integrity,
the United States could become a leader in the global response to
climate change and, by example, lead other nations in a
transition to a low-carbon economy. As the Robinson Township
court found, the way forward must reconcile economic
development with the conservation of natural resources. One
state’s actions will not be sufficient, though. The nation, indeed
the world as a whole, must embrace sustainable development
such that we can meet our current needs without jeopardizing the
ability of future generations to do the same. While the challenges
are great, we need to focus on the goal of climate stability. As
James Madison observed many years ago:
it is so much easier to descry the little difficulties immediately
incident to every great plan, than to comprehend its general &
remote benefits, that further light must be added to the Councils
of our Country before many truths which are seen through the
medium of Philosophy, become visible to the naked eye of the
ordinary politician.332

327. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720–21 (Fundamental rights are “implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if
they were sacrificed” (internal quotations omitted)).
328. Id. at 703, 721, 724.
329. Hansen et al., supra note 1, at 5.
330. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
331. Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 776 (2003).
332. Hunt, supra note 253, at 441.
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Until such time as politicians open their eyes to the
challenges and opportunities presented by climate change, the
courts have a crucial role in defining and defending the right to
atmospheric integrity.
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